1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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According to the April 1957 official records, 36 ninety Hsin Hsing



311 village farm families cultivated 61.74 *chia* (147.6 acres) of arable land
423 as owners and/or tenants.[13] Of this total, 16.29 *chia* (38.9 acres) were
still held by thirty-eight families as tenant land. The average amount
427 of arable land cultivated per household was 0.68 *chia* (1.6 acres).[14]

Because of the limited amount of land available, most villagers who want to buy or rent land for cultivation cannot be too particular
[493] about its location. They are usually willing to acquire any piece of land, so long as it is in the general area and can be conveniently reached by bicycle. Thus a villager's land usually consists of several tiny plots scattered throughout the surrounding countryside. On the average, the size of the separate plot is well under 0.5 *chia* (0.7 acres), which means that villagers must spend much of their time shuttling
[492] back and forth among their scattered small fields. If the fieldwork
[407] demands only a few light tools, the trip by bicycle is fast enough, but if it requires a water buffalo and heavy equipment like a plow, the trip from field to field takes a great deal of time. However, having the plots scattered this way can also be an advantage: all the land cultivated by
[312] one villager is not necessarily dependent upon the same irrigation ditch or even perhaps the same irrigation network. Thus a shortage of water in one waterway need not effect all of a farmer's holdings.

311 Many of the fields cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers are almost two
423 miles away, on the far side of the two neighboring villages Ta Yu and
427 Yung P'ing. For example, in the Yung P'ing area where Hsin Hsing
628 villagers rent or own much land, the fields are cultivated by farmers from at least three different villages. One field may be adjoined on three sides by fields owned or held by farmers from Ta Yu, Yung P'ing, or Hsin Hsing. This, of course, means these villagers will have some relationship with each other, especially if the fields are irrigated. (See Land Tenure Map, Chapter 4, for details.) The proximity of fields held by men from different villages is especially common in the area around Hsin Hsing, since the villages here are so close together that there is not very much open land between them. There are also a number of Hsin Hsing-owned wet fields beyond the two-mile range of the village, which are therefore not shown on the land map. In fact, a few villagers cultivate relatively large plots of dry land almost six miles from the village, since these crops do not usually need constant attention. In these cases the land is either tenant land still owned by public enterprises or is formerly land publicly or privately owned sold to the tenant under the Land Reform Acts of 1951–1952. The Hsin Hsing villagers originally rented these lands after the last war, when the competition for land was at its height.

423 These fragmented and scattered landholdings result from several
428 factors. The insufficiency of land caused villagers to buy or rent land
[427] wherever it was available. In addition, the system of inheritance of

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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landownership rights as well as the types of ownership patterns in Taiwan tend to foster such fragmentation and scattering of landholdings. The ownership of land is for the most part inherited in equal shares by the family's sons, including any son or sons by adoption. Although by law daughters may also inherit land, since they are usually married out of the family they do not participate in the inheritance.

All of the land owned by villagers comes under the official heading of privately owned land. Land can be owned by individuals or families under individual or joint ownership. Individual-ownership land is a piece of surveyed land which is owned and registered in the name of a single owner. Joint-ownership land is land surveyed as a single field and recorded in the name of one representative owner which is actually owned jointly by a number of people; each of the joint owners owns a portion of the surveyed field and cultivates his plot separately. The third kind of private-ownership land is corporate land. There are only a few relatively insignificant instances in Hsin Hsing of village patrilineal kinship groups (*tsu*) owning corporate land. In each case the landholding is small and is recorded in the name of the eldest *tsu* male—who in some instances has long since died. Most often *tsu* land is leased—usually on a rotation basis—to *tsu* family members. The rent paid is used to finance *tsu* functions such as the upkeep of the *tsu*'s main ancestral-worship room (no Hsin Hsing village *tsu* has an ancestral temple) and sometimes the expenses of ancestral worship. The land reform law has technically eliminated the category of such *tsu* or corporate landholdings.

Neither the earlier Japanese nor the present land tenure system permits subtenants in Taiwan; there is no such concept of ownership or tenancy of "subsoil" or "land surface" as was found to exist in many instances on the mainland (as discussed in Fei, 1939:174–196). According to both the law or official records and the villagers' concept of land tenure, a family—usually under the name of its senior male member—owns land. The land may be cultivated by that family itself or, for various reasons, leased to a tenant. The tenant cultivates the land and pays a predetermined rent—usually in kind—to the landlord. Until the 1949–1953 Land Reform Acts, tenants had no rights on the land except those granted by the landlord. Land reform has radically changed this. Today tenants and their families have certain rights on the land they cultivate and therefore a greater degree of security.

In spite of the pressures of the constantly increasing population on the land, there has been little development of any kind of important local industry. Except in some scattered brickworks and menthol-distilling factories in the area, there is little demand for the labor of

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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villagers who hold too little land to support their families.[18] Some village men peddle vegetables during the slack agricultural seasons or find some other seasonal work, but there is no real solution to the economic problem. Since Lukang offers few job opportunities for village people, the only alternative is for the village's labor surplus to move on to Taipei to find work. While the move to Taipei for most village men is merely a temporary migration to supplement family income, some establish themselves in the city and move their entire families there. Those who still have a small piece of land in the village area then usually rent it out, or ask someone else to cultivate it for them. The owner thus gains some economic security by retaining title to the land; very few people will sell their land outright.

## DIET AND NUTRITION

The Hsin Hsing villager is far from self-sufficient, either for food or other needs. After the harvest the villager consumes his own vegetables, rice, and sweet potatoes, but during the course of the year, he must buy a great part of his staple food. Vegetables, additional rice, pork, fish, salt, tea, sugar, sesame seed oil, peanut oil, lard, and any number of other items are purchased either in Lukang or from itinerant merchants. Additional necessary annual purchases like clothing, tools, and other necessities, almost none of which are produced by the villagers themselves, show how dependent the villager is on the outside world.

The diet of the Hsin Hsing villager, except perhaps for the most poverty-stricken, depends more on occasion than perhaps anything else. The foods eaten at daily mealtimes are usually quite simple and inexpensive, and thrift dominates these ordinary meals. However, on special religious or other festive occasions when it is necessary to feed guests, thrifty regard for the kinds and quantities of food served becomes the least important factor. A villager invites criticism from his fellows if he is not thrifty in his everyday eating and living habits, but the man who exercises thrift on a festive occasion when outside guests are present usually earns the reputation of being "stingy."

An additional determinant of diet is the phase of the agricultural cycle. During the harvest season, for example, it is customary for everyone engaged in the heavy work to eat five meals a day. The meal at the end of the day's work is particularly elaborate and nutritious. A man may also earn himself the reputation of being stingy if, for example, he is frugal with respect to the food he serves his field laborers at harvesttime. Word of his stinginess spreads quickly, and such a farmer may find it difficult to obtain field labor at future harvesttimes. The

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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grown depends mainly on the type of soil in the field. In the Hsin Hsing village area, most of the farmers grow the native *tsai lai* rice because it best withstands the weather, disease, and insects.

Within each major type of rice there are also sub-types, each of which has a slightly different growing season. A farmer may plant different types or sub-types in different plots, so that he will not have to plant and harvest all his rice fields at the same time.

The entire rice-growing operation is performed by hand labor. The farmer germinates his best rice from an earlier crop and then broadcasts it in a small, muddy, well-fertilized seedbed. While the seedlings grow—a period of thirty to fifty days for the first crop and fifteen to twenty days for the second—the paddy field is prepared for the transfer of the seedlings. The field is prepared in several operations; a water buffalo draws a wooden plow with a steel blade of adjustable depth and two different kinds of harrows. The preparation of one *chia* (= 2.39 acres) of land takes about seven days for one water buffalo and one laborer. Since many villagers do not own a buffalo (and even a landlord usually does not own one since he would not do his own heavy work), the animal and its owner—usually a fellow villager—must be hired to do the fieldwork. In 1958, the cost of hiring a water buffalo and a laborer was about NT $60–70 per day.

After the rice paddy is flooded the seedlings are removed from the seedbed by hand and transferred in rows by a small group of hired specialists. Such a man can transplant about 0.15 *chia* (0.36 acres) of land in one day. In 1958 he was paid over NT $20 a day, and at night he was given a large dinner, wine, and cigarettes. In the Hsin Hsing area this is considered a fairly high wage for a day's work. On the day the rice seedlings are transplanted, the wives of many farmers go to the village Earth God Temple to worship and pray for a good crop. Such food as whole fish, meat, and fowl are sacrificed and later served to the laborers.

Three times during the growing season the rice paddies are allowed to become relatively dry, to make weeding possible. This is done by the farmer's family or by hired village women who receive about NT $6 per day and no food. Also, during the growing period (about eighty-five to one hundred days after transplanting for the first crop, but a shorter time for the second), the fields are fertilized twice and sprayed with insecticide if necessary.

Rice harvesting is done by men and women in groups of ten; they are either hired or exchange labor. Usually a group of all men is preferred. Such a group can harvest an average of a little over 0.5 *chia* (1.2 acres) per day. The amount of land harvested depends upon the distance of the field from the house, and thus the distance the rice must be carried after threshing.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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243 461 A group of ten laborers works in the field as a unit, usually taking turns at the different tasks. Four laborers will cut the rice while four [177] others collect it and thresh it in the rotary foot-pedal threshing ma- [407] chine. (This machine was introduced by the Japanese in the 1930's, [426] and is now found throughout the area.) The machine is sometimes owned by the land operator but is often either borrowed or rented. [427] While the eight laborers are cutting and threshing, another laborer binds up the threshed rice straw, leaving it in bundles across the field. Still another laborer separates the rice from the straw in the box of the machine and puts the threshed rice into baskets, which are later carried to the farmer's house for drying, winnowing, and storing. The [824] straw bundles are later collected and put in big stacks near the farmer's house. The straw is gradually used for fuel, compost, and animal bedding.

243 433 The harvested rice is then used to pay taxes and rent and for fer- [262] tilizer or for human and animal (fowl) consumption. The surplus may [231] be sold either to an itinerant broker or one in Lukang. The rice which [442] is eaten or sold to brokers is milled locally. One *chin* of land in the first [256] crop produces about 7,000 to 8,000 *chin* of *tsai lai* rice, or about 10,000 *chin* of *p'eng lai* rice. (One *chin* is equivalent to one and one-third pounds.)

434 However, the landholdings in Hsin Hsing are small, and it is fairly 243 common for more than 50 percent of the village farmers not to realize [423] any cash for the crop. The greater part of the rice crop in general, even in areas with larger landholdings, is used by the farmer to feed his family and to pay various operating expenses. These operating expenses include, beyond labor costs, the payment of taxes, land payments either to the government—if the land was purchased under the Land Reform Acts—or rent to a private landlord, and payment for fertilizer. (The payment of these expenses in kind creates a problem which will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter.)

243 If the third crop is wheat, it is planted immediately after the second crop, anytime from late October to early or even mid-December. Wheat in Hsin Hsing is harvested from mid-February to mid-March, depending on when it was planted. It is harvested by hand, the plant [407] being pulled up root and all. It is threshed in the same machine used for rice and then completely dried in the sun. Usually, a broker comes [442] to the village soon after the harvest to buy the farmers' wheat. Al- [435] though the price for a *chin* of wheat is higher than for a *chin* of rice, [433] one *chia* of land can produce less than half the amount of wheat than it can of rice. (One *chia* of land produces about 3,000–4,000 *chin* of wheat.) In the past the crops have often been plagued by a wheat disease, and for this reason many farmers still do not like to grow wheat.

244 In the Hsin Hsing area sweet potatoes are the principal dry-land

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Large and expensive tools and work animals are also found in relatively small numbers. The oxcart, water buffalo, threshing machine, water wheel, and winnower are quite important to the farmer, but he rarely owns them. A villager may either rent a threshing machine from another villager or borrow it from a good friend or kinsman. However, a water buffalo for plowing or a buffalo and cart are more likely to be hired on a daily basis, its owner being hired to work the animal.

The villager who does not own a water buffalo or a threshing machine must adjust his own schedule in advance of the plowing or harvesting in order that it will not conflict with the schedules of people from whom he might borrow or rent the item. This can be troublesome if threat of a typhoon makes it imperative that he, like everyone else, harvest the rice crop immediately. Such an individual must take his chances and wait for the first available thresher. Luckily, such emergencies do not occur often. Even within the same village, farmers usually have slightly varied plowing or harvesting schedules.

Borrowing of small tools as well as many household items is both common and frequent in the village. When there is need for a tool, people prefer to borrow it from another villager with whom they have

TABLE 11

SURVEY OF TOOLS AND IMPLEMENTS OWNED BY 87 HSIN HSING VILLAGE FARM FAMILIES, AUGUST, 1958

| Tools and implements | Good condition | Poor condition | Unusable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Water buffalo | 17 | | |
| Oxcart | 12 | | 1 |
| Foot thresher | 10 | | |
| Hand thresher | 2 | | 1 |
| Water wheel | 10 | 4 | 4 |
| Plow | 28 | 2 | 5 |
| Hand harrow | 27 | | 1 |
| Foot harrow | 10 | 1 | |
| Hoe | 87 | 1 | |
| Sickle | 136 | | 1 |
| Bamboo basket | 144 | | 2 |
| Outside granary | 15 | 4 | 2 |
| Stone rice grinder | 6 | | 5 |
| Hatchet | 7 | | 2 |
| Leveler | 7 | | |
| Pitchfork | 17 | | |
| Insecticide sprayer | 4 | | 1 |
| Winnower | 8 | 1 | |
| One-bar bicycle | 39 | 2 | 2 |
| Two-bar bicycle | 22 | | |
| Sewing machine | 23 | 1 | 2 |

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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241 426 the closest relationship. Thus, a villager might have a relationship of frequent mutual borrowing with family members, neighbors, or friends. Sometimes a villager borrows a farm implement from a *ch'in ch'i* (a matrilateral or affinal relative), and in that case no money is [612] [602] paid nor a feeling of obligation incurred. But usually, unless a *ch'in ch'i* lives nearby, it is not likely that a large piece of equipment can be borrowed.

241 426 However, the decision to borrow a tool from another depends upon how good the *kan-ch'ing*[3] is between the two people. This is true even for *ch'in tsu* relatives—such as patrilateral parallel cousins—whose 571 *kan-ch'ing* may not necessarily be very good. If the *kan-ch'ing* between [602] two people is not good and one lends the other a tool, then the borrower will feel an obligation toward the lender and worry about it and will later send a gift of something to the lender in order to cancel the obligation. Until this is done, the borrower feels uncomfortable. [427] Therefore, rather than become involved in an uncomfortable situation, a villager often prefers to pay the NT $20 rent for a threshing machine to someone with whom his *kan-ch'ing* is not necessarily good. The payment makes it a simple commercial transaction, and there is no obligation.

241 426 427 Many villagers do not like to borrow an implement which seems to be in bad condition, since if it breaks down the borrower will be expected to repair it. Therefore, to avoid possible trouble, many villagers prefer to rent the implement so that they have no such responsibility.

241 426 571 But no matter whom the villager approaches for the loan of a tool, it is quite unusual to get an outright refusal. If the owner of the implement does not wish to lend it at all, or at least not to that particular person—perhaps because he has a reputation for not returning things promptly—he will offer some excuse. But since the villagers generally know quite well who is likely to be willing to lend them things, they limit their requests accordingly, and embarrassing situations do not often arise.

242 427 Certain implements, such as insecticide sprayers, which few farmers own, can be rented at a nominal charge from the local Farmers' Association. The government and the Farmers' Association are fostering the use of insecticides and thus make sprayers available.

241 422 404 [571] Most really expensive farm implements are owned jointly by several villagers. The families which join together to buy a threshing machine, winnower, stone rice grinder, insecticide sprayer, or water wheel do so for various reasons. Entering into a joint-purchase arrangement, however, is dependent upon the existence of good *kan-ch'ing* between them. Some households which are related, such as brothers or even patrilateral parallel cousins, may have inherited a threshing machine

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Farmers' Association has problems. The farmer who grows rice as his second crop must save some of his rice from the November harvest in order to make the 40 percent payment for the fertilizer for the first rice crop in February or March. If this rice is stored it is in constant danger from rodents, but if the farmer eats or sells his rice, he must then buy rice in the spring at the higher off-season price, in order to make the 40 percent payment for the fertilizer needed in February or March.

A larger problem concerns the association's role in collecting the farmers' rice for the Food Bureau. (This same problem arises when the farmer makes payment in rice after the harvest for land tax, land reform land, and the enforced rice sale to the government. This will be discussed later.) In order to deliver his rice to the Farmers' Association almost three miles from Hsin Hsing, the farmer must either use an oxcart or make several trips by bicycle. To save time and energy, he may hire an oxcart if he does not own one. The rice will not be accepted by the Farmers' Association (acting for the Food Bureau) if it is not dry enough. If this happens, the farmer must take his rice home again and dry it further.

Today, some people in the area who own oxcarts and who have enough capital to maintain large stores of dry rice make it a business to take over the full responsibility of delivering the farmers' rice to the Farmers' Association in acceptable condition. These people obtain the names of farmers and the amount of rice they owe to the government from the Farmers' Association. They then pick up the rice of the willing farmer and give him a guarantee, in the form of a receipt, specifying that the businessman agrees to take over the farmer's responsibility for the rice payment. If the farmer's rice is not dry enough, the agent can then use his own rice stores to make payment. The charge to the farmer for this service is 5 percent in kind of the rice delivered. Many farmers use this service in order to relieve their anxiety over the possible refusal of their rice and also to eliminate the problem of finding a means of delivery.

Still other problems face the farmer under the government's system of fertilizer distribution. When the farmer acquires his fertilizer through the Farmers' Association, he must take the kinds and amounts of fertilizer being sold, regardless of what he would like or thinks he needs. And, in order to buy the ammonium sulphate fertilizer which is necessary for the rice crops, the Hsin Hsing area farmer must also buy a good deal of nitrogen calcium (known as "black fertilizer") which is used mainly for sugarcane and sweet potatoes. The farmers in southern Taiwan, who grow more sugarcane, must take the ammonium sulphate as well as the nitrogen calcium fertilizer. The result is that many farmers in each area sell the fertilizer they do not need to

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ownership became even more concentrated in the postwar period than in the pre-war period" (Klein, 1958:53). Large numbers of tenants and would-be tenants were in continuing competition for the land they needed to support their families. The competition, unfortunately, tended to put the tenants at the landlords' mercy and helped perpetuate the already unsatisfactory land tenure system.

Klein also points out that the "increased demand for food by urban dwellers and for rural land by farmers, resulted in the many abuses practiced by rural landowners becoming qualitatively worse and quantitatively more numerous than before. One of the notorious abuses was that of charging oppressively heavy rents" (1958:53). From "1945 through 1947, rents of 60 per cent and 70 per cent (of the annual main crop) became not uncommon in the more fertile and densely populated areas. In some areas the rent was 'ironclad' which meant that in the event of crop disaster or failure, the rent, determined as a percentage of the normal or expected yield was to be paid in full anyway" (Klein, 1958:53–54).

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The high rental rates in the moderately fertile Hsin Hsing village area seem to have been standardized according to the type and quality (grade) of the land being rented, and were, in addition, influenced by the relationship between the particular landlord and tenant. Hsin Hsing villagers imply that land rents before the Land Reform Reduction Law were no higher than they are today. Their most vivid memory is one of insecurity on the land rather than excessive rents. Many seem to have forgotten how bad the rent situation really was. Former landlords, however, admit almost nostalgically that land rents in this area were as high as 60 percent of the annual main crop. But the landlord paid all the taxes, and he and the tenant shared the expense of the fertilizer. The tenant paid all the labor costs.

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Everyone agrees that rent was generally paid in kind, seldom in money, and "the landlord, as a rule, charged the tenant a fixed amount of rice for paddy land regardless of how small a crop the tenant might raise or what crop he planted" (Chang, 1954:10–11). Nevertheless, if the tenant, through his own efforts, increased the production of his rented land, he usually had to pay a larger rent. There is no question that this greatly stifled the tenants' incentive to increase production. The payment of rent in kind—in rice for paddy land—meant that "In case the tenant planted crops other than rice, he had to sell his crops and buy rice from [the] market to meet the charge. The buying and selling of crops meant extra losses to the tenant" (Chang, 1954:11).

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There is no indication before 1949 in the Hsin Hsing area that the landlord collected rent in advance. Usually, he took 60 percent of the rent immediately after the first crop was harvested and the remaining

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



40 percent following the harvest of the second crop. This system of rent collection continued in Hsin Hsing village until the Land Reform Program. However, villagers say that some landlords in other places collected rents on a 70 percent–30 percent basis, and a few even insisted on the rent being paid in full immediately after the first crop.

The only thing which gave the tenant any security in his tenancy was a good personal relationship or good *kan-ch'ing* with the landlord. This, of course, was only possible if the two lived close enough together to have some sort of contact. Although there certainly were large economic, social, and usually educational differences, so that in extreme cases tenants scarcely dared to approach the house of the landlord except on business, a definite personal relationship often did develop. A landlord generally had a paternalistic feeling toward his tenant, and the tenant in turn felt an obligation to him.

In those earlier days, the tenant always helped the landlord who lived in the immediate area, and especially one who lived in Hsin Hsing, with certain jobs. He was available to assist the landlord to build a house or to help at funerals, weddings, and other ritual occasions. Sometimes the tenant would send a birthday present or a duck or a chicken to the "good landlord in thanks" and in order "to keep good *kan-ch'ing* between them." In case of a death in the landlord's family, the tenant would send a sacrifice to show his respect. But such behavior from tenant to landlord depended strictly on their actual relationship so that not all tenants sent gifts or provided help for their landlords. Some landlords were considered "tight"—a term the villagers often use to refer to a man who is "close-fisted" with money, or to a man who, if he is a landlord, does not concern himself with his tenant or other people if it is going to cost him anything. Such a landlord would not be too likely to receive "favors" from his tenants.

If there was a crop failure, the "good" landlord usually gave the tenant some sort of rent reduction. Although there were in those days no special regulations covering rent reductions in emergencies, the tenant and landlord would discuss the problem if a crop failed because of a typhoon or a water shortage. The tenant might be asked to pay 70 to 80 percent of the normal rent, according to the seriousness of the crop damage. Once one landlord gave a tenant such a rent reduction, it was not uncommon for other landlords to follow suit.

However, there were inflexible landlords who would not reduce the rent under any circumstances. In such cases any good *kan-ch'ing* that had ever existed between landlord and tenant would certainly deteriorate. Then, since tenants had no lease or written contract, the landlord might ask for a higher rent on the land for the next year, which might be a first step toward taking the land away from the tenant entirely and finding a new tenant.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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entirely and finding a new tenant. Thus, while a tenant felt he would have some security on the land, if he could cement his relationship with his landlord or landlords, even such security was of questionable duration. And the tenants' problem was worsened by the small size of the fields, which meant that it was not uncommon for a man to have more than one landlord.

A good many landlords who rented land in the area to Hsin Hsing villagers did not live there. A number lived (as some still do) in relatively distant villages, and a few, usually businessmen, lived in Lukang or Taichung City. Since absentee landlords usually did not rely exclusively upon their land rents for a livelihood, they were often not very strict with their tenants. In the event of a crop failure, the villagers recall that most of these absentee landlords were willing to allow a rent reduction, perhaps even more so than the landlord who lived in the village area. It was not, of course, easy for the absentee landlords to operate their land by themselves or to find a new tenant or hired laborer to take care of the land for them. The landlord who lived in the village area could operate the land himself with hired laborers or else easily find a new tenant.

The tenant whose landlord lived in the immediate area considered the maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing* an important factor in determining his tenure. He apparently realized, nevertheless, what a slender reed it was, since he admitted that absentee landlords were easier to deal with. Keen competition for land, especially in the postwar period, resulted in a constant danger that other would-be tenants might approach the landlord and offer him a higher rent or other concessions. Under such circumstances the tenant could only try to fulfill all of his obligations to the landlord with the hope of maintaining a precarious goodwill.

I heard of several landlords in Hsin Hsing village and the immediate area who switched tenants every year, with hardly a word of explanation, as they received better rental offers. Although such landlords were extremely unpopular in the countryside, there was little that tenants could do. These landlords were well known in the area for such practices, and when labor was in short supply during the extremely busy part of the agricultural season, many local farm laborers refused to work for them. This technique of getting back at unpleasant landlords is still used today. One landlord family in Hsin Hsing was greatly disliked by the villagers in the postwar period and to this day often has difficulty in obtaining labor at harvesttime.

The case of this family is an excellent example of the landlord-tenant problem in Hsin Hsing. Good feeling and mutual aid had existed between the old landlord, who was head of his family, and many of his tenants. After the death of the old man—which was prior

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to land reform—his wife and sons were not concerned with continuing these good relations. Whenever the opportunity arose for securing higher rents from a new tenant, the wife and sons threw the former tenant off the land. Most of the villagers felt hostile towards this family for its greediness and betrayal of the formerly good *kan-ch'ing*.

Ironically, in the postwar period, it was the constant fear and uncertainty which prevented the active growth of any movement or demand among the tenant farmers in this area for some kind of land reform. Such activity would immediately endanger a tenant's relationship with the landlord, especially the local ones, and his tenure on the land would be jeopardized. Even to complain about the situation was dangerous. Other farmers, desperately in need of additional land, might inform the landlord that the tenant was criticizing his treatment or perhaps abusing or neglecting the land. Then, after planting the seed of distrust, the informer might offer to rent the land himself. The tenant's fear of such competitive tactics and his insecure relations with his landlord ensured his continued submission to the system.

## LAND REFORM PROGRAM

In mainland China, land reform in the form of a rent reduction program had been attempted as early as 1929 by the Chekiang provincial government (Chang, 1954:16). The program and others, which were intended eventually to transfer landownership from landlord to tenant, were attempted by other provincial governments also, as well as by the Nationalist government in various provinces such as Fukien, Szechwan, and Kwangsi up to the time of the Communist take-over in 1949 (Chang, 1954:16–19; T'ang, 1954:89–95). However, while some of the programs were successful, they were all very limited and at best effective only in localized areas of the mainland.

After the Nationalist government took over in Taiwan, a large-scale Land Reform Program was successfully carried out on the island. This was a "Three Step Program" instituted officially by the National government in 1951 and completed in 1953. Chang (1954:20) wrote: "The first phase, also the mildest reform, seeks improvement of the tenant's living without overthrowing the tenancy system or changing the tenant's status. The second phase, the converting of a fraction of tenants into owner-farmers by selling public land to them, may be taken as a trial or transitional stage. The third phase, Land-to-the-Tiller, aims at turning all tenants into owner-farmers . . . the last and final goal of land reform."

The program was based on a law known as the "Regulations Governing the Lease of Private Farm Lands in Taiwan Province," promulgated by the provincial government of Taiwan on April 10, 1949.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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423 427 671 The law provided for a ceiling on farm rental of 37.5 percent of a predetermined estimated yield, regardless of any production above that figure. In the event of a crop failure, the law stipulated that "the lessee and the lessor may make arrangements between themselves for the reduction of rent in accordance with local custom. . . . If the total yield is less than 20 per cent of the normal yield, the entire rent payment shall be remitted" (T'ang, 1954:222). It guaranteed, through landlord-tenant contracts, that the rights and welfare of the tenant farmer would be safeguarded. However, there was still "no adequate provision for the protection of tenant's rights owing to the restrictions imposed by certain articles of the Land Law and the Civil Code. Hence there occurred, after the enforcement of farm rent reductions, many cases in which some landlords tried to take back their leased land from their tenants by resorting either to compulsion or promises of material benefit" (T'ang, 1954:32).

T 423 427 Loopholes in the law made it possible for landlords to make up for having to reduce the land rent by charging house rent and other new charges. In 1949 there were several cases of landlords who successfully convinced their gullible, or perhaps trusting, Hsin Hsing village tenants that there was no reason to draw up a land contract, since their verbal agreement had always been adequate in the past. On this basis, the landlord promised, the tenant "could consider that his family would be able to work the land forever on the same basis of mutual trust and good *kan-ch'ing* which had always existed between them." The rent would, of course, be the legal 37.5 percent paid by other tenants.

In several instances in Hsin Hsing and in other villages—according to an informant who works in the Public Office and used to have a position in the Land Office—uneducated tenants were persuaded not to report themselves as tenants. In these cases, since there was no one claiming tenancy rights, the landlord would say that he himself tilled this land. If later the rightful tenant should dispute the matter (and there have been a number of such cases), the landlord would officially claim that the tenant was not a tenant at all but only a hired laborer. In this way, the landlord, who realized there was to be a transfer of land to the tenants, felt he had a better chance to retain ownership of his land. In Hsin Hsing village, there are still a few small plots of land covered by such a verbal agreement between a landlord and his tenant.

### *Farm Rent Reduction Act of 1951*

Tn 423 671 The many instances of landlords' abuses of tenants plus the weak enforcement of the 1949 provincial law led to a need for the "Farm Rent Reduction to 37.5 Percent Act." This national act was passed by

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
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the Legislative Yuan on May 25, 1951, and promulgated by the President of the Republic of China on June 7, 1951. Although it did not eliminate all abuses of tenants, it went a long way toward this end in the Hsin Hsing area as in all of Taiwan.

The act strictly enforced the rent reduction policy, holding land rent to 37.5 percent of the main annual crop. Production was predetermined on the basis of two crops a year in the Hsin Hsing area. Under its provisions any increase in production brought about through the tenant's own efforts benefited the tenant only, not the landlord. The rent was still to be paid in kind and in two installments, one after each harvest. The act also contained rules for rent reductions in cases of crop failure, specifying that the "Farm Tenancy Committees" of the area should investigate each case, determine the extent of the crop failure, and stipulate the amount by which the rent should be reduced. "If, owing to crop failure, the total yield is less than 30 per cent of the normal yield, the entire rent payment shall be remitted" (T'ang, 1954:225).

More important, the 1951 act provided security never before known by the Taiwanese tenant farmer. The tenant's right to work the rented land without fear of being evicted by the landlord was secured by a minimum six-year contract. The law even provided that when the six-year lease expired, the landlord could not take back the land for self-cultivation if he could not cultivate it himself, if his income was already sufficient to support his family, or if the tenant and his family, by loss of the leased land, would lose their means of livelihood (Chang, 1954:22–23).

With the tenant's security on the land protected, he no longer had to kowtow to his landlord or attempt to maintain good *kan-ch'ing*. Today, it is common to hear a tenant, formerly courteous to his landlord whether he liked him or not, actually curse him when he comes in his own wagon to collect and load the tenant's land rent. (The tenant formerly delivered the rent to the landlord.) On one such occasion in Hsin Hsing, K'ang, a landlord from another village, came to pick up his rice rent. In Mandarin, the name is pronounced K'ang, but in the local Taiwanese dialect, it is pronounced K'ung. But *K'ung* in Taiwanese also means stupid. The Hsin Hsing tenant, while watching the landlord load the rice in his wagon, laughingly repeated over and over for all to hear, "K'ung K'ung is here for the rent." It was obvious to everyone including the landlord that the tenant was punning on his name. While the others stood around and laughed, the landlord continued his work without a word.

The 1951 act also eliminated many other abuses of tenants by landlords. The landlord could be imprisoned if he forced the tenant by duress or force to give up the land. Collecting farm rent or deposit

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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(In the following pages this uncultivated land will not be considered, since we are concerned only with productive land.)

Neither the total amount of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers nor the actual number of farming families changed significantly as a result of the land reform. Nevertheless, there were striking internal

TABLE 13

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL LAND CULTIVATED (OWNED AND OPERATED) AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES IN EACH CATEGORY IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE FOR PRE-LAND REFORM (1949–1951) AND POST-LAND REFORM (1957)

| | 1949–1951 | | 1957 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land classification | Area *chia* | Number of families | Area *chia* | Number of families |
| Privately owned (individual, joint, corporate) | 25.8204 | 62 | 29.5567 | 62 |
| Land reform land | — | — | 15.3716 | 36 |
| Tenanted land | 35.7376 | 58 | 16.2925 | 38 |
| Total number of farming families | — | 92 | — | 90 |
| Total land surface cultivated | 61.5580 | — | 61.2208 | — |
| House and other uncultivated lands | 2.9909 | — | 2.9909 | — |
| Total land surface owned and operated, cultivated and uncultivated | 64.5489 | — | 64.2117 | — |

changes in the land tenure situation in the village, especially after the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953, which greatly affected the figures on landownership and tenancy. Privately owned land rose to 29.5567 *chia* (71 acres), and an additional 15.3716 *chia* (37 acres) of leased land sold to the former tenants under the 1953 act caused tenancy to decline to 16.2925 *chia* (39 acres).[2]

## EFFECTS OF THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM

The 61.5580 *chia* of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers at the time of the 1949 "Regulations Governing the Lease of Private Farm Lands in Taiwan Province" was of two types: leased land and privately owned land. (See Tables 13 and 14.) Of this, 35.7376 *chia*, or 58.1 percent of the total, was rented by fifty-eight Hsin Hsing village households. Actually, there were a few more tenants, working a few very small plots of land, who were not recorded or given contracts in 1949. These few had been persuaded by their landlords to allow themselves to be classed as laborers instead of tenants. The remaining

[text continues on p. 101 -- Analyst]

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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HSIN HSING VILLAGE
LAND TENURE MAP

*Map 4. Land tenure map for Hsin Hsing village. Data from Luhang Land Office and Pu Yen Hsiang Public Office Land Section. Data as of 1957 except for land tenancy, which is as of August, 1958.*

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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25.8204 *chia* of cultivated land was privately owned by Hsin Hsing villagers under individual, joint, or corporate ownership. The largest part of all cultivated land was paddy land. (See Table 14.)

Most of the leased land in 1949 was owned by 25 different private landlords. A small part belonged to publicly owned enterprises. Of these twenty-five private landlords, only two were Hsin Hsing villagers; they owned about 5.2 *chia* of land or about 14.6 percent of the total leased land—almost all of which they rented out to fellow villagers. (See Table 15.) Of the remaining leaseholds, 28.5

TABLE 14

AREA AND TYPES OF LAND CULTIVATED BY 92 HSIN HSING HOUSEHOLDS BEFORE LAND REFORM, 1951

| Land type | Paddy field | Dry field | Total (*chia*) | Percentage (*chia*) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owner-cultivated | 25.4867 | 0.3337 | 25.8204 | 41.9 |
| Tenanted | 31.9950 | 3.7426 | 35.7376 | 58.1 |
| Totals | 57.4817 | 4.0763 | 61.5580 | 100.0 |

TABLE 15

OWNERSHIP OF HSIN HSING VILLAGE TENANTED LAND, 1949–1951

| | Total number of *chia* Hsin Hsing tenanted land | Hsin Hsing tenanted land owned by Hsin Hsing landlords | Hsin Hsing tenanted land owned by private outside landlords * | Hsin Hsing tenanted land owned by public enterprises |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amount of tenant land | 35.7 | 5.2 | 28.5 | 2.0 |
| Percent of tenant land | 100.0 | 14.6 | 79.8 | 5.6 |
| Number of private landlords | 25.0 | 2.0 | 23.0 | — |

* Landlords living outside Hsin Hsing village as well as outside the area.

*chia* or 79.8 percent of the total was owned by 23 private outside landlords. Thirteen of them, owning over 19 *chia* of this land, lived in the two villages adjacent to Hsin Hsing, Ta Yu and Yung P'ing. The other ten, owning 9 *chia*, lived in more distant villages or in the cities and had little direct contact with their Hsin Hsing tenants. The remaining two *chia* of tenant land was public land, owned by public enterprises such as the Taiwan Sugar Corporation.

By 1954, the three-step program of land reform had been completed, and the almost 36 *chia* of leased land that had been cultivated by Hsin

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Hsing villagers had been reduced to slightly over 16 *chia*. Almost 4 *chia* of the privately owned portion of tenant land had been sold by the owners to their Hsin Hsing tenants after the 1951 Rent Reduction Act (and before the 1953 act of expropriation). More than 2 *chia* of public land, eight plots rented to four Hsin Hsing villagers, were made available to these farmers for purchase over a ten-year period by virtue of the 1951 Land Act which governed the sale of public farmlands. And in 1953, under the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, the government purchased an additional 13.5 *chia* (in forty-six plots) of privately

TABLE 16

AREAS AND TYPES OF LAND CULTIVATED BY 90 HSIN HSING HOUSEHOLDS AFTER LAND REFORM, 1957

| | Paddy field | Dry field | Total (*chia*) | Percent (*chia*) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owner-cultivated | 42.2345 | 2.6938 | 44.9283 | 73.4 |
| Tenanted | 14.9100 | 1.3825 | 16.2925 | 26.6 |
| Total | 57.1445 | 4.0763 | 61.2208 | 100.0 |
| Percentage | 93.3 | 6.7 | — | — |

TABLE 17

AREAS OF CULTIVATED LANDS IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM

| | Before implementation | | After implementation (1957 records) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Area (*chia*) | Percent | Area (*chia*) | Percent |
| Owner-cultivated | 25.8 | 41.9 | 44.9 | 73.4 |
| Tenanted | 35.7 | 58.1 | 16.3 | 26.6 |
| Total | 61.5 | 100.0 | 61.2 | 100.0 |

owned Hsin Hsing tenant land from the landlords and made it available to the 33 former tenants for eventual ownreship. One of these 33 families had also purchased public land under the 1951 act.

With the completion of the Land Reform Program of 1953, the land tenure picture for Hsin Hsing village had changed radically. According to the September, 1957, records, as a direct or indirect[8] result of the land reform, the amount of land leased by villagers was reduced by almost 55 percent from 35.7 *chia* of land in 1949 to 16.29 *chia* in 1957. Whereas in 1949 land leased by villagers had represented 58.1 percent of the total cultivated land, by 1957 it was reduced to 26.6 percent of the total. (See Tables 13, 14, 16, and 17.) (See Map 4 for distribution of village landholdings.)

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



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Prior to land reform, 14.6 percent of the leased land in Hsin Hsing was owned by Hsin Hsing villagers and 85.4 percent by outsiders, including public enterprises. (See table 14.) After land reform, in 1957, only about 9.1 percent of the leased land was village owned; 90.9 percent was owned by outsiders. (See Table 18.)

TABLE 18

TENANTED LAND IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE, 1957

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| | Paddy (*chia*) | Dry (*chia*) | Total | Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land surface tenanted | 14.9100 | 1.3825 | 16.2925 | 100.0 |
| Tenanted land owned by Hsin Hsing landlords | 1.4758 | — | 1.4758 | 9.1 |
| Tenanted land owned by landlords outside Hsin Hsing | 13.4347 | 1.3825 | 14.8172 | 90.9 |

In the pre-land reform period (1949–1951), of the 92 farming households in Hsin Hsing village, 58 households (63.0 percent) were tenants, and of these 30 (or 32.6 percent of the village's farming households) owned no land whatsoever. (See Table 19.) In the post-land reform

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TABLE 19

NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES IN HSIN HSING BY SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND, 1951

| Amount cultivated in *chia* | Own all land | Mixed owner-tenant owns more than half | Mixed owner-tenant owns less than half | Pure tenant | Total number of farming families | Percent of farming families |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Less than 0.1 | 4 | — | — | — | 4 | 4.3 |
| 0.1–0.3 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 15 | 16.3 |
| 0.3–0.5 | 8 | — | 6 | 8 | 22 | 23.9 |
| 0.5–1.0 | 9 | 2 | 11 | 12 | 34 | 37.0 |
| 1.0–1.5 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 10.9 |
| 1.5–2.0 | 2 | — | — | 1 | 3 | 3.3 |
| 2.0–2.5 | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 1.1 |
| 2.5–3.0 | — | 1 | 1 | — | 2 | 2.2 |
| Over 3.0 | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | 1.1 |
| Number of families | 34 | 6 | 22 | 30 | 92 | — |
| Percent of families | 37.0 | 6.5 | 23.9 | 32.6 | — | 100.1 |

period, the 1957 records show ninety farming households listed in the village of whom only 38 (42.2 percent) were tenant households; of these only 9 (10 percent of the total number of farming households)

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

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owned no land, while the remaining 29 tenant householders were partial landowners as a result of the Land Reform Acts. (See Table 20.)

TABLE 20

NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES IN HSIN HSING BY SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND, 1957

| Amount cultivated in *chia* | Own all land | Mixed owner-tenant owns more than half | Mixed owner-tenant owns less than half | Pure tenant | Total number of farming families | Percent of farming families |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Less than 0.1 | 4 | — | — | — | 4 | 4.4 |
| 0.1–0.5 | 12 | 1 | — | 3 | 16 | 17.8 |
| 0.5–1.0 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 20 | 22.2 |
| 1.0–1.5 | 18 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 36 | 40.0 |
| 1.5–2.0 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 10.0 |
| 2.0–2.5 | 2 | — | — | — | 2 | 2.2 |
| 2.5–3.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Over 3.0 | — | 2 | — | — | 2 | 2.2 |
| Number of families | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | 1.1 |
| Percent of families | 32 | 20 | 9 | 9 | 90 | — |
| | 57.8 | 22.2 | 10.0 | 10.0 | — | 99.9 |

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TABLE 21

AREA OF FARMS CULTIVATED BY 56 FARMERS WHO PURCHASED LAND THROUGH LAND REFORM, 1957

| Kinds of farmland | Area in *chia* | | Percent |
|---|---|---|---|
| Land purchased under Land-to-the-Tiller Program | | 15.3716 | 59.6 |
| Paddy field | 13.0115 | | — |
| Dry land | 2.3601 | | — |
| Land originally owned and cultivated by farmers themselves | | 4.5224 | 17.5 |
| Paddy field | 4.4374 | | — |
| Dry land | 0.0850 | | — |
| Leased land | | 5.8980 | 22.9 |
| Paddy field | 4.7665 | | — |
| Dry land | 1.1315 | | — |
| Total area | | 25.7920 | 100.0 |
| Paddy field | 22.2154 | | 86.1 |
| Dry land | 3.5766 | | 13.9 |

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423 The rest of the land worked in Hsin Hsing in the post-land reform period consisted of the already mentioned 15.3716 *chia* purchased either under the 1951 act for the sale of public land or the 1953 Land-to-the-Tiller Act, plus the 29.5567 *chia* owned by the villagers as indi-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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the equivalent of owner operated land (and legally this is how it is considered), then it is notable that of the 61.2208 *chia* operated by the villagers in 1957 44.9283 *chia*, or 73.4 percent, was privately owned and the remaining 26.6 percent tenant operated.

Thirty-six families, about 40 percent of the Hsin Hsing village farming families, were benefited by the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953. Before the reform program, 19 of these 36 families owned no land at all, and their livelihood depended strictly on the land they rented and whatever outside income they had. However, the other 17 families, besides their rented land, owned only about 4.5 *chia* of land, most of which was paddy field. After the Land Reform Program, which affected almost 15.5 *chia* under the 1951–1953 acts, land that these 36 families cultivated as owners increased to 19.9 *chia*, of which about 17.5 *chia* was paddy. In 1957, 19 of these same 36 households continued to work a little below 6 *chia* of land as tenant farmers. (See Table 21.) This tenant land is cultivated under the strict enforcement of the 37.5 percent Rent Reduction Act.

The change in the landholding status of the 36 families directly affected by the reform program is shown in Table 22, Parts A and B. Before land reform only 3 of the 36 owned more than 0.5 *chia* of land, but in the post-land reform period, 17 of the 36 owned more than 0.5 *chia*. The average area purchased by Hsin Hsing tillers under the reform was 0.44 *chia*, usually in one and sometimes two plots of land per family. This means that in Hsin Hsing village, of the 54 plots of land sold to the tillers by the government, the size of the average plot sold was less than 0.3 *chia* of land.

Chang Yen-t'ien (1954:86) writes that in Taiwan about 46.44 percent of the total pre-reform tenants, including part-tenants, purchased land through the reform program. But he notes that "more than half of the former tenant families . . . are still entirely or partly under the influence of tenancy."

For Hsin Hsing village, the records show that 62 percent of the 58 pre-reform tenants purchased some land reform land, and the figure is probably this high because of the higher rate of tenancy in Hsin Hsing than in Taiwan as a whole. Thirty-six households, or 65.5 percent, of the 58 are still to some extent tenants, however. This is mainly because the land they rented happened to be part of the 3 *chia* of land the landlord could retain under the 1953 law. While this was true for landlords in all of Taiwan, the average land purchase figure may be larger for the whole of Taiwan than for Hsin Hsing because elsewhere in Taiwan there were large tracts of public land available for purchase and, in addition, at the time of the restoration there was little Japanese-cultivated land in the immediate area of Hsin Hsing for Hsin Hsing villagers to take over. These factors have gener-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ally contributed to a lower average amount of land tilled by owners in Hsin Hsing than in other villages and areas.

The two major improvements in the land tenure situation as seen in Tables 19, 20, and 23 are: first, the significant increase in landownership and decrease in tenancy, especially the decrease in the number of pure tenants; and second, the large increase in the number of Hsin Hsing mixed owner-tenants, who in 1957 owned more than half the land they cultivated.

It can also be seen from Table 23 that, in 1957, 70 of the 81 land-

TABLE 23

STATISTICS ON LANDOWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION FOR HSIN HSING VILLAGE: PRE-LAND REFORM (1951–1952) AND POST-LAND REFORM (1957)

| Size of class (*chia*) | 1951–1952 Number of farming households | 1951–1952 Percent of households | 1957 Number of farming households | 1957 Percent of households |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Own no land at all | 30 | 32.6 | 9 | 10.0 |
| Own less than 0.1 | 12 | 13.0 | 9 | 10.0 |
| 0.1–0.5 | 18 | 19.6 | 18 | 20.0 |
| 0.5–0.5 | 12 | 13.0 | 19 | 21.1 |
| 0.5–1.0 | 13 | 14.1 | 24 | 26.7 |
| 1.0–1.5 | 4 | 4.3 | 6 | 6.7 |
| 1.5–2.0 | 2 | 2.2 | 2 | 2.2 |
| 2.0–2.5 | 1 | 1.1 | 3 | 3.3 |
| Total Landowners | 62 | 67.3 | 81 | 90.0 |
| Total farming households | 92 | 99.9 | 90 | 100.0 |

holding families still owned less than one *chia* of land, and 46 of the 81 owned less than a half-*chia*. Thus, the land reform brought about virtually no increase in the total amount of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers or increases in the number of families cultivating the land in each size category. While the reform produced important changes in the internal nature of the land tenure situation, it did not and could not solve the basic problem—an insufficiency of cultivable land coupled with rapid population growth.

Of the 115 households registered in the village in 1957, only 90 households can actually be considered farming families. The 25 registered households of Hsin Hsing village which do not cultivate land at all must be classed as village nonfarming, landless families. The breadwinner in such families may work locally as a hired farm laborer or may have gone off to work in Taipei because of the land scarcity. Once assured of an adequate living in the city, a few of such men sold off or gave up the very small portions of land they were cultivating. Once well settled in Taipei, a few brought at least part and sometimes

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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annual main crop, the new owner is mentally in a better situation, and socially he has climbed to the rank of owner-farmer.

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Often, villagers who have purchased land under the reform program do not really consider themselves its owners. Besides knowing that they are not yet reaping any increased income from the land, many have a "seeing is believing" attitude. They will believe that the government has made it possible for them to own the land when they no longer have to pay on the mortgage and when they earn an income from the land equivalent to what an owner-farmer earns. They recognize what the future may hold for them as "real owners," but, in the meantime, the burden is extremely heavy.

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Villagers who work outside Hsin Hsing have done more to raise the standard of living than has the decrease in tenancy. The increased use of cash has also led to an apparent rise in living standards. In Japanese times, villagers tended to save their money toward future land purchase. Today, people no longer save money for fear of inflation; instead, they are using their cash to purchase tangible goods—bicycles, more and better clothing, and so on, are increasingly in evidence in the rural area.

## THE NATURE OF PRIVATE-OWNERSHIP LAND

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The 29.5567 *chia* of privately owned land in Hsin Hsing village falls into three categories: (1) individually owned, 55.3 percent of the total private land; (2) jointly owned, 61.5 percent of the total; and (3) corporate or community owned, only 3.2 percent of all the private land owned. (See Table 24.) This classification and the percentages for each type in Hsin Hsing approximate the situation in Taiwan as a whole (T'ang, 1954:98–107).

The system of individually owned land is rather simple, since it consists of portions of land legally owned by one individual who, in most cases, represents a family. On all land records this land is always listed in the name of that one owner. As can be seen in Table 24, very little of the land individually owned in Hsin Hsing is house or road land; it is almost all cultivated land.

Joint-ownership land in Taiwan is one of the most complex forms of private ownership to record and keep track of. It is a common phenomenon making up the largest percentage of the privately owned land in Hsin Hsing as well as in Taiwan. A plot of land is owned jointly by from two to hundreds of individuals. Each joint owner will own a portion of the plot—one-third, one-fifth, or one-twelfth, and so on. In many cases, in Hsin Hsing at least, the joint owners do not own equal shares. Each joint owner may work his share independently or in small groups according to family relationship.

Under the land reform record-keeping system, rather than register-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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this type of landholding belongs to a *tsu* group. The *tsu* may be a very large one which dominates a whole village, as in many Taiwanese villages, or it may be one of many small *tsu* groups in a village such as Hsin Hsing. In Hsin Hsing only a few of the *tsu* groups own such land, which represents only 3.2 percent of the total land owned by Hsin Hsing villagers. Almost half of this corporate land is the house land for *tsu* members. Almost all of the cultivated corporate land, about 0.5 *chia*, belongs to one of the larger *tsu* in Hsin Hsing, the K'angs. Most of their land is unofficially rented out to two of the *tsu's* own members, who then pay rent of 37.5 percent to the *tsu*. The money is used for some of the *tsu* expenses such as religious ceremonials or the repair of the *tsu's* main ancestral-worship room.

In the official land tenure records, the corporate land is listed in the name of some members of the *tsu* group; it is not recorded as rented-out land. In the several cases of corporate landholdings in Hsin Hsing, the *tsu* members listed as owners in the records are long since deceased, but their names are still carried in the books. The cultivated portions of the corporate lands are administered by respected *tsu* elders. Generally, in Hsin Hsing the *tsu* group pays little concern to its corporate lands, since the amount of them is actually insignificant.[4]

## LAND REFORM AND THE LANDLORD

The government compensated landlords for lands expropriated in 1953, but because of the unstable economic situation the compensation was not in cash; 70 percent was paid in land bonds and 30 percent in Government Enterprise Stockshares. In order to insure the value of the bonds against the fluctuations in currency values, they were issued to the former landlords on a commodity basis and, at maturity, were to be paid in kind instead of in cash. Rice was to be paid in return for expropriated paddy land and sweet potatoes for dry land. The principal and interest at 4 percent per annum on the land bonds are being paid to the former landlords over a ten-year period in twenty equal semiannual installments (a payment schedule notably similar to that made by the purchasers of the land from the government). The land bonds are transferable and can be sold on the open market or used as security in financial matters (Chang, 1954:76–77; T'ang, 1954:147–151; 154–163).

After the restoration the national and provincial governments owned 70 percent of the industrial enterprises in Taiwan. These had been taken over from the Japanese at the end of the war. At that time, it was the desire of the Nationalist Chinese government to transfer all public enterprises to private owners except those relating to national defense, those of a monopolistic nature, and those affecting utilities.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
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problem of village solidarity. It is perhaps too soon to tell how successful these new leaders will be, but it seems likely that if disorganization continues as a result of the gradual withdrawal from leadership by the landlord class, the most capable among the aspirants for village leadership may find, by necessity, increasing acceptance from their fellows.

## EFFECT OF LAND REFORM ON THE LAND MARKET

In the Hsin Hsing area, another effect of the Land Reform Program appears to be a decrease in the free circulation of land, especially in land for rent. Because the 1951 Rent Reduction Act is still in effect, tenants who have contracts are remaining on the land and not giving up their right to tenancy. The landlord can no longer freely change tenants, even when the contract period ends, unless the tenant wishes to give up his rights. At the same time, as the value of rents decline, "the value of leased farm land . . . [is] lower than that of owner cultivated-land" (T'ang, 1954:63). Thus, many landlords do not want to sell their land when its value is low. But even more, under such conditions prospective buyers would gain little from buying land occupied by a tenant who has a contract and a fixed rent.

Landlords who have been tilling some land themselves will very rarely rent it to anyone now. To do so would mean that the landlord, although receiving his 37.5 percent rent, would have little control over his own land. As a former large landlord put it, "Before the Land Reform the landlord made the rules if he wanted more rent. Today the government makes the rules." If the landlord should find that for some reason he no longer can till the land himself, it is more likely that he will hire laborers to work the land. Formerly, he would probably have rented it out. Thus, there is very little land available today for anyone wishing to rent it.

There also seems to be little turnover of publicly and privately owned land which was purchased from the government by former tenants under the 1951 and 1953 acts. Only under great financial stress will such villagers give up their rights to assume full ownership at the end of the ten-year amortization period. According to the 1953 act, a farmer who is unable to continue payments on such land may ask the government to repurchase the land for resale to other farmers. "The Government shall in such a case reimburse to the purchaser in one lump sum the purchase price already paid" (T'ang, 1954:191, translation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, 1953, Chapter IV, Article 29). However, despite the law, when such instances have arisen in the Hsin Hsing area, the land has not been resold through the government but by the farmer directly to another farmer who has approached him for additional land to support a growing family.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



Such purchases have a surface appearance of legality, but, strictly speaking, they are not. According to the 1953 law, land purchased from the government under the act can be sold by the original purchaser only after he has become a full owner by completing the twenty payments to the government. In current practice, the purchaser, using a middleman or a land broker, secretly gives the owner enough rice or money to cover the outstanding payments to the government. In addition, he gives him more money or rice to cover the payments already made, plus a substantial bonus. When all the remaining payments have been made, usually in one lump sum, the land is officially turned over to the new owner. By law he must be able to till the land himself. This should eliminate the likelihood of landlords engaging in such transactions. In Hsin Hsing village this method has so far been limited to the small landholder who through expanding financial resources has been able to buy additional land to support an expanding family. Such people cannot easily acquire land through completely legal means because of the decreased turnover of land since land reform.

However, some landlords in the area not only manage to purchase such land reform land by this method but manage to buy back their own land which, expropriated by the government, has since passed through several hands. They may then even rent it out, even though the law says that such expropriated land can only be sold to someone who will till the land himself. According to a reliable informant, this can be managed when the land has passed through several hands since 1953, so that the government agencies have lost track of it and are no longer aware of the history of its transfers. The Land Office responsible for such land can easily lose track of it. The land tenure data are recorded in the Land Office in so many different books and cards that it is difficult to maintain any adequate check on the transfers of individual plots of land. Besides this, not all the data are accurate, or even kept together in one office. In the Hsin Hsing village area for example, some records are kept in the Lukang Land Office and some in the Pu Yen Hsiang Public Office, according to a system for recording land tenure data prescribed by the provincial Land Office in Taipei. In addition, there seems to be little investigation by land agents of the ownership of lands in the area.

Probably the greatest source of purchaseable land since the land reform is private-ownership land which formerly belonged to large landholders. At the time of the expropriation in 1953, many landlords got their start in outside business or commerce, and many have since proved successful. As a result, many of them have sold more and more of the three *chia* of land which the 1953 law allowed them to retain, using the money for further investment in business or light industries. In the Hsin Hsing village area the lands of such former landlords have

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



recently represented the largest portion of land available for purchase on the open market. Even such land, however, does not necessarily add a great deal to the land market, since much of it had already been rented out.

The result of this static condition in the land market appears to be an ossification of socioeconomic mobility *within* the rural area. The traditional means for improving one's family's status by acquiring more and more land and the advantages which accrue to the landed are no longer so readily attainable. The main outlet now available for those who have hopes of improving their economic condition is to acquire some kind of business interest, usually outside the Hsin Hsing area, and, in such a case, those people rarely remain part of their *native village*.

## LAND SCARCITY IN HSIN HSING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

We see that in spite of the Land Reform Program (and perhaps in part because of it) and in spite of the apparent increase in the productivity of the land, there has been a continuing land-population imbalance and hence an increasingly serious land scarcity in the rural area. Some of the attempts to solve this continuing problem have already been discussed here. For the remainder of this chapter we will examine in some detail the consequences of one solution to this problem—out-migration—for the villagers, their families, and for the village as a whole, particularly in role behavior and attitudes toward the land.

Even now the problem of a growing population and a resulting land scarcity in the area has greatly affected the lives of many villagers. The most important effect has been an increased mobility to new centers of employment such as Taipei, where villagers carry on small business enterprises or more usually work as unskilled laborers. This trend toward increased mobility has already spread to other villages of the area, and is likely to become more extreme all over the island as the population pressures increase.

The lack of any extensive light industry in the area which could absorb excess local labor leaves little alternative for families which do not have enough land to support them. Even a Hsin Hsing village family which has enough land to support all its members and keep most of them occupied for the greater part of the year must nevertheless contend with the problem of agricultural slack seasons. Some of the young men and women of such families may possibly find employment in the local menthol oil factory or brickworks. Whether full- or part-time, the job is close enough to home so that the villager can go home whenever his labor is required by the family.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



The night before the wedding day, starting at midnight, a *pai-pai* is held at the boy's home. A Taoist priest (*tao shih*) officiates at the ceremony, held in honor of T'ien Kung to thank him for guarding the boy so that he could reach marriageable age, and prayers are said for the future of the boy and his family. At the same time, many lesser gods are invited to the *pai-pai* to be worshipped, and statues of these gods (which may belong to other villagers) are brought to the ancestral-worship room of the boy's home. The village orchestra performs during most of this ceremonial to entertain T'ien Kung. Many expensive foods, including at least one whole dressed pig and goat, bottles of wine, and a good deal of paper money are offered in honor of the gods and their soldiers and horses. (A description of the Taoist pantheon is found in Chapter 8.)

The *tao shih* invites the gods to partake of the sacrifices and transmits to them the prayers of the family. In the course of the ritual the *tao shih* and the participating members of the family, including the groom and his father and brothers, simulate trips to heaven and to the underworld to communicate with the gods. A shaman, known as *t'iao t'ung* (his broader functions are also described in detail in Chapter 8), accompanies them on these "trips." He is possessed by a local, less powerful, and important god known as an ambassador god and thus acts as the intermediary between the family and the higher gods. "After all," queried a villager on this point, "can a common man go directly on his own to see and talk with an emperor?"

Much of the food offered at the *pai-pai* is sent the next day as gifts to the girl's family; during the next several days it is fed to the guests who attend the wedding festival as well as the many people, usually *ch'in tsu* or fellow villagers, who help in the preparations and entertainment of the guests at the girl's village. The cost to both sets of parents is very great, and the poorest families save for a long time or borrow money in order to have a proper wedding festival.

While the boy's family is holding the *pai-pai* on the night before the marriage, the girl's family is busy with preparations for the next day. When the marriage broker, accompanied by the carriers bearing more gifts, and the village orchestra arrive, they are fed in the girl's village. Then, they help the girl's family load the many carts with her dowry and the sweet cakes which accompany the bride when she goes to the groom's village in her sedan chair.

The vehicles which carry the gifts to the bride's family and take the dowry back to the groom's village are either rented wheeled carts drawn by men hired in Lukang or trays carried on poles by the groom's *ch'in tsu* and/or fellow villagers. Only a wealthy family can afford to use the many hand-carried trays, since all the carriers must be fed banquet food and those who carry heavy items are given *hung pao* (money wrapped in a red paper packet). Far fewer wheeled carts are

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



The bridal train follows a predetermined route, passing through several villages to display the dowry for all to see, even if the bridal couple live in neighboring villages and even if they happen to come from the same village. All along the route the special wedding music of gongs and horns attracts villagers who wish to see the procession.

The time of arrival in the groom's village, usually in the afternoon, has previously been fixed by a geomancer. Most of the villagers are outdoors waiting to examine the dowry. The bride's sedan chair is placed before the door of the boy's house, but the girl may not leave the chair and enter the house until the dowry has been ritually examined and accepted by the groom. Once this is done, a child of the household formally welcomes the bride to her new home, and she is led from the sedan chair and escorted into the house by the matchmaker. On entering the house the bride steps over a burning brazier and steps on and breaks a piece of red tile. The first act symbolically cleanses her of any ill fortune she may have picked up accidentally along the way (an example of such an accidental contamination is for the wedding caravan to pass a funeral along its route). The second act symbolizes the bride's willingness and her intention to obey her new family. These acts completed, she is led to a private room where "according to custom" she spends the next several hours alone except for occasional visits from the matchmaker.

That evening a festive banquet is held to celebrate the marriage. An even number of courses is always served, sometimes as many as sixteen to eighteen, and a great deal of wine is consumed. The banquet is attended by many guests, male and female, old and young, for the most part relatives (*ch'in ch'i*) and friends of the boy's family only. The adult males eat apart from the women and children. Either a *ch'in tsu* of the groom or else a fellow villager plays host at almost every table of male guests to see that the guests eat and drink and are generally entertained. Finger games to promote the drinking of wine are usually played. Other male *ch'in tsu* and village friends and neighbors serve the food to the guests, while the women help in the kitchen. The male cooks are hired from the village or from the local area. Dishes, tables, and chairs are hired for the occasion in Lukang and brought into the village by oxcart.

About halfway through the banquet the bride is brought out and, together with the groom and his parents, is formally presented to the assemblage of guests and villagers by a highly regarded elder *ch'in tsu* or a respected villager. After this introduction, many respected guests are called upon to give brief speeches; in these they remind the young couple of their duty to their parents and express hopes that children will soon result from the marriage, especially boys. The speeches completed, the groom goes from table to table, drinking with and accept-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5



The situation developed largely when the traditional land tenure system was modified by Taiwan's Land Reform Program between 1949–1953. An important aspect of the reform was the initiation of a rent reduction and limitation law, but even more important was the introduction of an official contract between landlord and tenant which secured the tenant's rights on the land whatever the relationship, good or bad *kan-ch'ing*, he had with the landlord. The contract for the first time made it clear that the relationship between landlord and tenant and their mutual responsibilities were economic. Once their interaction was limited to an economic relationship as circumscribed by an official contract, it was no longer as important whether either party concerned himself with the traditional maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing*.

Thus, in addition to the already discussed decline of some landlords' socioeconomic and even political interests in the village as a result of the land reform, the deterioration in the basis of *kan-ch'ing*, and with it the prestige of many in the landlord class, has frequently meant that unless landlords who remained in the village had other ways of maintaining their high positions in the community, they lost their usefulness as mediators, being no longer capable of exerting influence and leadership in the community.

On the kinship level, the code which regulated relationships between hierarchal unequals has likewise been affected by change, thus worsening the community's ability to resolve local social conflict. This has occurred on the levels of the *tsu* and even, to some degree, the family. In conflict within the *tsu* or village, as well as beyond the village, the *tsu* organizations through their leaders have always played a role in settling all conflict by mediation. While the several Hsin Hsing *tsu* have never been powerful organizations backed by extremely wealthy members and wealth in corporate land usually necessary to give them extensive local sociopolitical influence, *tsu* authority has recently been further weakened, as we have seen above, by the extension of the villagers' socioeconomic interests beyond the home area. As a result, even the *tsu* have apparently lost much of their ability to exert sanctions against their own members or their opponents. Thus, as a result of the weakening of the social hierarchy, there has developed a more general inability to use the former traditional respect for particular leaders of the landlord class or *tsu* as a force with which to settle disagreements.

It is not purely a matter of the weakening of the traditional hierarchical relationships between people, however, which has diminished the respect for traditional mediators. This has been intensified by the tendency toward a growing equalitarianism on both the social and economic levels of life among the villagers. The tendency was born of greater educational opportunities, increased election of officials, land

less than half an acre. Many were tenant farmers who owned no land at all, cultivating the fields of wealthy landlords in return for some percentage of the annual yield of the land. Until the relocation of the Taipei Hsinchu railroad in 1923, a few landless families made a living transporting local goods down the Tamsui River to markets in Wanhua, Hsinchuang, and Taipei. The only opportunities for industrial employment were in the coal mines of Tucheng and Hsinchuang, and the work there was often sporadic and always poorly paid. The generally low standard of living in Hsiachichou was reflected in the construction of village homes. Although kiln brick and tile had been inexpensively produced in the Taipei region for at least a hundred years, there was no one in Hsiachichou who could afford to build a brick house or to roof his house with tile. Houses were built instead of wattled mud and roofed with thatch. It was not until the early 1920's that the first brick and tile house was constructed in Hsiachichou, and the use of these materials did not become common until the end of the next decade. Of the 47 houses in Hsiachichou in 1935 only 15 boasted a tile roof, and of these only 4 had more than one brick wall. As the older villagers so often put it in describing their former condition, "We were the kind of people who had to sell our rice and eat sweet potatoes."

Living so close to poverty and yet aware of the luxuries enjoyed by their landlords and the wealthier merchants, many families in Hsiachichou must have been tempted to sell one of their male children as a biēng-liēng-kiá:. There was always a ready market for male children on Taiwan, and the price they commanded was for most village families

ultimate goals and overall responsibilities. The result was that most female children were given out in adoption despite the fact that this committed them to an unhappy life. Whatever fears a child's parents may have had about her fate as an adopted daughter could not save her because they were not the decision makers, and even if they had been it is doubtful that they could have done other than give the child away. Most families were so constrained by their limited means and their goals that there was little room for concern about the child's personal welfare.

In the years since 1930 this situation has changed considerably. For one thing, the poverty which forced many families to give away their female children as a means of conserving their resources has been greatly alleviated. Most of the villagers of forty and fifty years ago earned a living as tenant farmers, but the post-war population of the village has included a number of skilled workers, several families with fairly large land holdings, several school teachers and petty officials, and a dozen or more families who own small and fairly prosperous businesses. Even those who still earn a living on small land holdings and as laborers are now earning more and living somewhat more comfortably than did their fathers and grandfathers. The general improvement in conditions in Hsiachichou is apparent in an improved diet, the widespread use of bicycles and radios, and most strikingly in the construction of village houses. The thatch roofs and wattled walls of the early decades of the century have been almost entirely replaced by tile and kiln brick. Of 49 houses in Hsiachichou

3: Wolf F-5 (1959-1961) 1968 AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Peihotien

*chapter 6*

[p. 59]

# LIM SO-LAN: A SECOND WIFE

About twenty years ago a former villager who still owned a building site in the heart of Peihotien decided that his land should be earning money. On it he built a long brick building that looks very much like a warehouse. He cut four doorways in the front and a smattering of windows and fitted the interior into four separate apartments. Two of the apartments were sold to their present occupants; the other two are leased by families who came to the village within the last ten years. All four families are fragments. They each have an ancestral altar in their guest halls, but two of the altars, though littered with images of gods and ritual paraphernalia, lack ancestral tablets. There are ancestral tablets on the other two altars, but the surnames on them are not the same as that of the family who burns incense before them. The apartments are spacious, in good repair, and in all but one case show evidence of an adequate income. But, the people who live in them are not families in the Taiwanese sense of the word. Their past is not tied to a neat line of descendants; their present is in a house that displays no confidence in the future—wings cannot be added on to an apartment to shelter future generations of married sons and grandsons.

Lim Hue-lieng bought the largest apartment in this row house when he moved his second wife and his daughters out of his father's house. Lim So-lan still lives there with her two daughters, her eldest daughter's husband, and her three grandchildren. She is in her middle forties now and looks her age. She wears the modified Western clothes

piece for a .009 chia piece plus a sum of cash, and was the culmination of a two-year negotiation process.

The registered plot sizes are not directly related to the size of the paddy fields. Larger plots may be divided into two or more fields and some smaller plots are combined into one field. Both the extreme fragmentation and the narrowness of the terraces contribute to the small size of paddies. Correlated with the small size is the complete absence of gasoline-powered cultivators which have become so popular on the plains. This degree of fragmentation does not permit the most efficient use of the land. The government has begun a program of land consolidation in other parts of the island (Department of Information, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1962:78-83). Although villagers are aware of the program and believe it would be a valuable step for the village, everyone fears he would not get a reasonable share in a government-ordered consolidation, i.e., he would give up pieces more valuable than he would receive. Although theoretically the process should be seen as a zero-sum game, no villager can be found who thinks he would be a winner or even break even.

Prior to the above-discussed land consolidation, Taiwan underwent an extensive land reform program which proceeded through three steps. The first step was rent reduction, enforced in April of 1949, which limited farm

rent to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the total main crop yield (C. Chen, 1961). Since the usual rent in the Sanlei area averaged about fifty per cent of the main crop, this reduction immediately affected the economic situation of village tenants. It had a secondary effect of reducing the land value of tenanted land because the rental income was lowered and flexibility was lost due to the requirements for a minimum lease of six years, binding on heirs, successors, and assigns.

The second step involved the sale of public land in a series of six successive sales between 1948 and 1958 (Koo, 1968:36) with most plots sold after 1951 (Koo, 1968: 35). There was no paddy land affected by these sales in Sanlei although some villagers did acquire mountain land in the various sales. According to villagers and by notation on land records, the sale of mountain land to tenants in Sanlei had actually begun under the Japanese.

The third step was the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953 which was designed to accomplish three basic objectives:

> (1) to help tenants acquire landownership without increasing financial burden; (2) to protect the interests of landlords; and (3) to convert land-holdings into industrial holdings (Koo, 1968:37).

In essence, land was compulsorily purchased from certain landlords and sold on easy terms to their tenants. The

423 property subject to forced sale included a landlord's excess over 3.0 chia, land owned jointly, and land owned [427] by a lineage or temple (C. Chen, 1961). This too had little effect in Sanlei because the village never had high rates of tenancy. It is estimated that 75% of the paddy land was owner-cultivated before the land reform program. As described above, much of Sanlei land is not of high quality. Traditionally, there has been a higher percentage of owner-operated fields where most land is low quality (Kirby, 1960:70). In the Land-to-the-Tiller program, only 15 Sanlei paddy plots totaling 1.0175 chia, less than 8% of the paddy land, changed hands. Three of these plots were part of one man's excess holdings over 3.0 chia and one was owned by a temple. The remaining plots were lost because a tenant was renting land held by joint owners.

There were no large land-holdings in the area immediately around Sanlei but large holdings were common closer to Hsin Tien where land grades of 6 or 7 are common. One landlord who owned 30 chia of paddy fields lived in T'oulei but only a small portion of his holdings were located in Talei Li.

A typical case to illustrate a transfer (forced sale) was that of Liao Mou-tu and Liao Mou-ti, two of the wealthier villagers (Liao Mou-tu's chia is diagramed in Figure 5). These two men were brothers whose household had divided but subsequently, had jointly purchased .05

natural vegetation and forestation but much is being developed. A considerable quantity of the mountain land in Sanlei and also outside village boundaries is owned by the government. Some has been purchased by villagers for the government is encouraging its development. Prior to 1962, it was leased by the government for 25% of the main crop but now, rent is fixed and reasonable, on long-term leases at $380.00 per chia per year. The current price of mountain land is about $20,000.00 per chia if undeveloped and ranging up to $100,000.00 per chia if planted with excellent crops such as mature fruit trees.

The remaining categories are important but not economically significant. Houseland land is that on which the house is built but also includes the very small vegetable gardens adjacent to the houses. Vegetable gardens are located near the house so as to be convenient for the deposit of night soil. Burial land takes up a considerable part of the community. As previously stated, this area has many good feng shui locations, most of them on steep slopes. Other types of land categories include temple, roads, and worthless plots.

The vast majority of the land in Sanlei remains either owner-cultivated or leased from the government. Moreover, the owner-cultivators tend to live in Sanlei or an adjacent village. Some tenants are renting from a fellow villager as illustrated by the neighbor who leases

427 .17 chia of paddy field from the barber. The absentee landlord is relatively rare, often a former villager who migrated to the city.

123 Sanlei villagers also own land outside the village
423 but we were only permitted to check official records inside the village boundaries of Sanlei and Erhlei. It is difficult to obtain accurate figures through interviews since there is a fear of tax increases. As a result, the disparity between villagers' reports and official holdings was striking. Records of outside holdings kept being refined all during the study by following men to work in the fields. People would reveal more about their neighbors' holdings than their own.

423 Some of the categories and grades are inaccurately
127 recorded on official records. No piece is overgraded be-
651 cause the township land official is contacted to report losses, i.e., caused by erosion, in order to have the taxes reduced. On the other hand, improved land is not called to the attention of officials. Some of the dry land is really paddy land and some of the mountain land is now dry
[654] land with orange orchards or tea fields. Over a four year period there was a Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (J.C.R.R.) and farmers' association sponsored soil conservation program for mountain land. When a farmer constructed proper terracing, he was rewarded with United
[651] States surplus flour. Only about 60% of the mountain-land

627 they must be skilled in inter-personal relations and since it takes time to build a reputation which includes all these specifications, particularly the last one, most good mediators are between the ages of 50 and 60.

671 The entire legal process in China, both formal and informal, seems to be more concerned with "reasonableness" and "fairness" than with hard definitions of "right" and "wrong." Decisions do not seem arbitrary and have a high level of predictability.

427 There are a number of kinds of local participation. 686 Special mediation boards are created for special purposes 672 such as dealing with disputes generated out of the various Land Reform Acts. A dispute between an owner and tenant over land illustrates the concept of justice. A villager owned .3 chia of paddy land which he operated primarily with hired labor while practicing a trade. He was drafted into the army and leased the land to another villager with several small children. The lease was up, his service was completed, and he wanted the land back although he was still unmarried and practicing his trade, but the tenant was poor and needed the land. Although technically the owner should have obtained the land, the board, recognizing the needs of the tenant, decided the lease should be extended for three more years. The lease is due to end again next year and there will be another board case because both parties still want the land. Since the owner

427 is not married and still earns a good income in his trade
686 and the tenant is still poor with small children, the
692 same outcome of another extension is expected. But since the owner is seeking a wife, he plans to argue that he too will soon have small children to support. He does not expect to regain possession of the land but rather, to minimize the term of the extension and set the stage for eventual control of the land after the next lease termination. The owner is annoyed but does not feel the decision was unreasonable. Other villagers agree the owner had the law on his side and a legal claim to the land. Nevertheless, they too agree the decision was the only "fair" solution. The owner and tenant are neighbors and although there are some hard feelings, overt expression of them was not observed.

674 There have been few formal arrests of villagers and few occasions in which villagers have appeared before a criminal court. The son of a villager with a repair shop in town is serving a six-month sentence on a bad check charge which he claims was caused by someone who stole his
689 "chop." Another villager was arrested twice for being drunk and disorderly in Hsin Tien and each time, spent the night in jail. In addition to a small fine, he was forced
[558] to listen to a stern lecture which caused him a great loss of face.